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Summary
Social welfare for the whole community is the basic tenet of Islamic social 
justice. In modern Islamic Republic of Iran it is also a strong political appeal, 
used by the successive Iranian governments. The core of the Islamic Revolu-
tion was not only ideological positioning of political Islam, but also the quest 
for social justice in a country characterized by economic inequality. Effects 
of the Iran-Iraq War, nepotism and corruption, system of bonyads, and inex-
perience in governance are basic difficulties of the Islamic Republic, together 
with social inequalities in urban-rural, women, youth, and ethnic minorities 
nexus. 
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Introduction
On 22 Bahman or February 11, 2014, the Islamic Republic of Iran celebrated 35 
years of existence. It was the anniversary of the 1979 Islamic Revolution, a major 
turning point in the 20th century’s political history. Today, Iran is rather different 
than it was in 1979. Externally, the country has strangled relations with much of the 
Western world, with Saudi Arabia and a few other Sunni Muslim countries, while 
the United States and Israel are deemed as the worst enemies of the Iranian state. 
Internally, the country hosts one of the most complex political systems in modern 
history, a two-tier system consisting of a democratically elected government and 
parliament on one side, and the religious councils on the other, making it a unique 
mix of representative democracy and semi-theocratic autocracy. The 35th anniver-
sary, however, was largely different from many others. It came in a time when rap-
prochement of Tehran and Washington was at its highest rate since Iran helped the 
US to overthrow the Taliban regime in Afghanistan in 2001 and position the North-
Croatian Political Science Review, Vol. 52, No. 4-5, 2015, pp. 163-186
164
ern Alliance as the future government body. Internally, the country faces several 
major issues which might in the future divert the course of development. 
In this article I argue that the future of a stable and respected Islamic Republic 
depends, among other things, on the outcome of social populism, which is based 
on the Islamic notion of social justice, delivering social justice and growth of the 
economy. Given the vast literature on the Islamic Revolution and the Islamic go-
vernment in Iran, it is surprising that the economy has not been at the fore of expla-
nations seeking to gauge the sustainability of the Islamic Republic. The geopoliti-
cal situation in the wider Middle East and the nature of Islamic governance in Iran 
notwithstanding, the history of 20th century Iran clearly shows the revolutions (such 
as the Constitutional Revolution in 1905 and the Islamic Revolution in 1979) broke 
at the moment when the economic situation became unbearable. A new form of so-
cial welfare in Iran, founded on the Islamic notion of solidarity and help for others, 
gained momentum among the Iranian people. Changes in the social and economic 
system may well be one of the main issues regarding the future of the Islamic Re-
public of Iran, among Iranians as a nation, among women and youth, and among the 
country’s ethnic minorities. 
This article is divided into several parts. First, an overview of the theoretic ap-
proach to the social care and economy in Islam is introduced, with a special em-
phasis on the writings of Ayatollah Khomeini. Then, the Iranian social system is 
examined, with a special emphasis on the state subsidiary to help the people, Is-
lamic taxes and bonyads. Then, the article shows how the economic history of Iran, 
and three revolutions (the Constitutional Revolution, the White Revolution, and the 
Islamic Revolution) were connected to changes in the bazaar1, social welfare and 
economy. The outcome of this article is to show that the Islamic Republic is vulner-
able in the same way as all previous forms of rule were to the social welfare issues 
and the support of the people, and shows from where we can expect dissatisfaction 
may come from and how the Iranian governance system can respond to it. 
I use the term populism in accordance with the general idea of a type of poli-
tics that involves the “...defence of the (supposed) traditions of the little man against 
change seen as imposed by powerful outsiders, which might variously be govern-
ments, businesses, or trade unions (and is) anti-intellectual in tone” (Oxford Concise 
Dictionary of Politics, 2003: 427). More closely associated to the Iranian case study 
is Abrahamian’s description of populism as a movement of the propertied middle 
class that mobilizes the lower classes, especially the urban poor, with radical rheto-
ric directed against imperialism, foreign capitalism, and the political establishment: 
“Populist movements promise to drastically raise the standard of living and make 
1 The term bazaar is a reference to the Tehran bazaar, the central point of the Iranian economy.
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the country fully independent of outside powers. Even more important is attacking 
the status quo with radical rhetoric, they intentionally stop short of threatening the 
petty bourgeoisie and the whole principle of private property. Populist movements 
thus, inevitably, emphasize the importance, not of economic social revolution, but 
of cultural, national and political reconstruction” (Abrahamian, 1993: 17). 
Social Justice and the Islamic Economy
The Islamic tradition puts great emphasis on social welfare. According to a Hadith, 
“you should be merciful to people on Earth and God on high will be merciful to 
you”, whereby the personal salvation is connected to serving others. To find God, 
Islamic tradition says, is to help the poor and the needy, as a mean of spiritual pro-
gress. Many critics said it is futile to employ a 1400 year old way of social welfare 
in the modern world and they have criticized the Islamic Republic for doing so. The 
first Iranian Rahbar, Ayatollah Khomeini wrote in his political testament that “it 
is absurd to say that social justice, which was to be practiced from the beginning 
of creation, and fighting against crimes and cruelties, which were to be avoided, 
can no longer be exercised in the age of the atom. The claim that Islam is against 
modern innovations (...) is nothing but an idiotic accusation. If innovation and new 
features of civilization means inventions, new scientific discoveries, and industrial 
progress, it should be known that neither Islam nor any other monotheistic religion 
has ever opposed such things. On the contrary, Islam and the Holy Qur’an cultivate 
scientific and industrial development emphatically” (Khomeini, 1998: 29). In the 
same testament Ayatollah Khomeini warns that Islam does not support oppressive 
and uncontrolled capitalism “...which deprives the masses” (ibid.: 87). He conti-
nues: “The Book and the Tradition seriously condemn this type of capitalism and 
regard it as opposed to social justice. Although some have thought, wrongly, that 
Islam favors an uncontrolled form of capitalism, that is not true! Such malreasoning 
veils the shining face of Islam and paves the way for biased attacks by the enemies 
of Islam, who consider it as a capitalist regime on the order of the USA, England, 
and other Western plunderers. (...) Islam is neither a regime that opposes private 
property, like Communism, Marxism, and Leninism (...) Rather, Islam is a balanced 
and moderate regime that recognizes ownership and respects it in a limited form of 
production and consumption. If this is implemented, a sound economy and social 
justice will result from it, for social equity is a prerequisite for having a healthy re-
gime.” Indeed, “the basic élan of the Qur’an – the stress on socioeconomic justice 
and essential human egalitarianism – is quite clear from its very early passages” 
(Rahman, 1984: 19). 
One of the modern Islamic scholars, Fazlur Rahman, clearly states that the 
state has to fulfill the needs of people, and differs Islam from Communism pointing 
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exactly to the fact that it “...provides the best kind of prop for the communist slo-
gan that religion is opiate of the masses” (ibid.). Dorraj calls the Islamic Republic 
a corporatist state, whereby corporatism is “...recognized as a populist strategy that 
reconciles class differences and incorporates the nation into an organic whole. The 
corporatist strategy encompasses integration of both realms of economic and cul-
tural life. While negating both Marxism and capitalism, corporatism purports to 
present a third path of political development” (Dorraj, 1992: 149). Khomeini ad-
vises the institutions to “...reassure the nation so that private and creative initiative 
proliferates in order to make the country and government reach self-sufficiency in 
all areas including light and heavy industries. I advise those who lawfully acquire 
wealth to invest their justly earned gains for innovative development works in agri-
culture, rural development, and industries (...) I advise all people to make every ef-
fort for the welfare of the deprived classes. (...) It is far from fairness that one per-
son owns scores of buildings while scores of other people of his community lack a 
single room in which to live” (Khomeini, 1998: 88, 89). 
Social justice is also evident with the famous Islamic revolutionary Ali Shari’ati 
who joined the “God-Worshipping Socialists’ Movement” as a student (Vakily, 
1991: 11). Combined with the publications of Jalal Al-e Ahmad, and especially 
his idea of gharbzadagi or Occidentosis, which perceives westernization as an ill-
ness (Al-e Ahmad, 1983; Varzi, 2011), these were the core ideas of Muslim intel-
lectuals for the revolution. Both Al-e Ahmad and Shari’ati, however, leaned to the 
communist side in the early stages of their careers. Thus, the Islamic tradition has 
been upgraded in the modern world with leftist ideas. It is very difficult to deline-
ate what is an Islamic tradition and what is the influence of social democratic ideas 
from the West. The Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) addresses mainly issues of private 
law and not public policy. Fiqh is not a unique body of jurisprudence, it is pertinent 
upon different schools and thoughts that explain in their own way the sayings from 
Qur’an and Hadiths. Although many critics warn there was no public policy as such 
in the Prophet Muhammad’s time, and certainly no will of his own to establish a 
political organization, others claim the Caliphate itself, made by his followers, is 
the main piece of evidence that supports the applicability of the Islamic fiqh in the 
realm of public policy. Post-revolutionary Iran had to wrestle with this debate in 
order to invent rules and regulations based on the jurisprudence that often did not 
even address the issues at hand.
The famous five pillars of Islam, however, focus on Islamic taxation, and it is 
based on the idea of social justice in the ummah (community of believers). Social 
justice is at the core of the Islamic Republic. Many observers say that support for the 
Shah regime in effect failed during the years of economic crisis and unequal distri-
bution of the wealth. The Revolution had three generally acknowledged objectives: 
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“...democracy, national independence and social justice. (...) the third (objective was 
directed) against the uneven development of capitalism in Iran” (Amirahmadi, 2009: 
92). It is often argued that the Iranian Revolution gained such widespread popu-
lar support precisely because it highlighted egalitarianism and social justice. At the 
same time, this notion is widely overlooked in the international community’s un-
derstanding of Iran and the Islamic Republic. Ayatollah Khomeini rightfully made a 
comparison between Islam and leftist ideologies in his testament, as the tenets of the 
Islamic economy are indeed fiscally left oriented. The major difference is the source 
from which this orientation toward economic egalitarianism comes. 
In the Iranian case it is obviously religious practice, based on the Qur’an and 
the Hadith, as well as the other Islamic sources which place an emphasis on social 
justice and highlight the problems in society when there are great wealth gaps and 
stark differences in living standards. At the beginning of the Iranian Constitutional 
Law, there is a verse from the Qur’an that considers the development of social jus-
tice one of the Prophet Mohammad’s prophetic missionary goals: “Certainly we sent 
our apostles with clear arguments, and sent down with them the Book and the ba-
lance that men may conduct themselves with equity”. When coupled with the legal 
provisions in Shari’a law, it becomes not only a religious obligation, but a political 
one. The Constitution is full of these emphases. For example, article 20 of the Con-
stitution states that “all members of the nation, both men and women, shall receive 
equal protection from the law and enjoy all human, political, economic, social and 
cultural rights, with due observance of the principle of Islam”, and in Article 3, Para-
graph 12, that the government is obliged “to lay the foundations of a correct and 
just economy on the basis of Islamic rules for creating social welfare, removing po-
verty and eliminating any form of deprivation whatsoever in the fields of nutrition, 
housing, employment, health care and generalizing social insurance”. The previous, 
Pahlavi regime, set out to transform Iran into a “modern” industrial power using the 
West’s industrialization and social modernization model. After initial success, the 
model crashed, and the popular uprising gained its momentum, precisely on issues 
that were so important they became part of the Constitution. The Islamic Republic 
took the Pahlavi model as a brilliant example of failure, and commenced on a path to 
an independent and economically self-sufficient society that would abide the princi-
ples and laws of Islam: “This Islamic model, however, was strongly aligned with a 
populism that combined the radical language of anti-imperialism and egalitarianism 
borrowed from secular and religious Leftism” (Keshavarzian, 2007: 4). 
The developing country was at that time experiencing a huge demographic 
and socioeconomic boom, which was especially encouraged by the Islamic cleri-
cal elite. The end result was a system deeply characterized by social populism and 
Islamic economic tradition, which is officially based on moral entrepreneurship: 
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“...what is not permitted in Islam is to acquire wealth and assets through illegal 
means and violation to others. In addition, morally it is not accepted for mankind to 
consider wealth and assets as its ultimate goal. In fact, wealth is only an instrument 
but not a goal” (Sadeghi Neshat, 2009: 99). One of the instruments in achieving the 
goal of fairness and reduced inequality are the taxes. The basic Islamic taxes are 
zakat and khoms, whereby zakat is used traditionally as tax on wheat, barley, dates, 
raisins, gold, silver, camels, cattle and sheep, and as an obligatory precaution, upon 
the wealth in business. Khoms, on the other hand, is an Islamic tax applied to prof-
its or a surplus of income, legitimate wealth which is mixed with some illegitimate 
wealth, mines and minerals, precious stones, treasure, “spoils of war” and land pur-
chased by a non-believer (al-islam.org, 27.7.2014), and involves at least 2.5 per 
cent of annual assets (Davis, Robinson, 2006: 172). Muslim charity is based upon 
verses in the Qur’an, saying: “You will never attain piety until you spend some-
thing of what you love” (Qur’an 3/92), and “Charity is for the poor, the needy, those 
working at collecting it, those whose hearts are being reconciled, for freeing of cap-
tives and debtors, and in striving alone God’s way, and for the wayfarer, as a duty 
imposed by God” (Qur’an, 9/60). Throughout the centuries, collecting zakat has 
varied, but there has been great flexibility in adapting to social and political circum-
stances. There is some doubt whether these taxes are really obligatory by Iranian 
law, as the Constitution argues that people are required only to pay taxes to support 
the poor, not the state, with a footnote which quotes that the Shi’as are expected to 
part willingly with one-fourth of their surplus worldly goods, zakat, and one fifth 
of their surplus liquid cash, khoms, each year, to meet the needs of the poor and the 
needy. In fact, khoms is mandatory only for Shi’a Muslims: “...khoms, one fifth of 
residual income, payable to the marja’ 2. Half of khoms goes to Sayyids, descend-
ants of the Prophet; the other half is sahm-e emam, literally the ‘Imam’s share’, con-
sidered to be the Imam’s inheritance from the Prophet and a marja’ receives it in his 
capacity as representative of the ‘Imam of Time’; he is free to spend it as he deems 
suitable. The sahm-e emam is thus a major source of independent wealth and power 
for the religious leaders” (Mir-Hosseini, Tapper, 2006: 11). 
The rise of the Islamic Republic coincided with the rise of social and economic 
populist reforms, which were in accordance with the proclaimed goals of the Revo-
lution. Such reforms are known throughout the world, especially in the Latin Ameri-
can countries. They involve “a set of economic policies designed to achieve specific 
political goals. Those political goals are (1) mobilizing support within organized 
labour and lower-middle-class groups; (2) obtaining complementary backing from 
domestically oriented business; and (3) politically isolating the rural oligarchy, fo-
2 Lit. source of emulation; a title for a grand Ayatollah with the authority to make legal decisions 
within the confines of Islamic law.
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reign enterprises, and large-scale domestic industrial elites. The economic policies 
to attain these goals include, but are not limited to: (1) budget deficits to stimulate 
domestic demand; (2) nominal wage increases plus price controls to effect income 
redistribution; and (3) exchange rate control or appreciation to cut inflation and to 
raise wages and profits in non trade-goods sectors” (Kaufman, Stallings, 1991: 16). 
In Iran, these populist policies were taken through several processes: “(a) through 
the expansion of the public sector and state institutions; (b) through speculative com-
moditization of urban land as a result of both populist state policies and local land 
grabs; and (c) through the etatisation of the economy, whereby direct involvement 
by the state in the production and distribution of essential goods led to the emer-
gence of new state clients who accumulated wealth through their political connec-
tions” (Ehsani, 2009: 45). The Islamic Revolution successfully incorporated the ru-
ral and provincial inhabitants in the decision-making processes, it united “declining 
traditional social groups (the ulama and the bazaaris), some of the upwardly mobile 
social groups (a sector of the alienated lay intellectuals supportive of the regime), as 
well as the downtrodden of the city and the countryside” (Dorraj, 1992: 154). 
After the 1979 revolution there were many ideas how to make the economy 
work. The Islamic Republic embarked upon wide subsidies programs involving 
basic needs: housing, nutrition, medical treatment, education and facilities neces-
sary for setting up a family. The economic system is divided in three sectors: pub-
lic, cooperative and private. The public sector consists of all large-scale industries, 
foreign trade, large mines, banking, insurance, power supply, dams and large irri-
gation channels, radio and television, post, telegraph and telephone, aviation, ship-
ping, road, railroads, which all are in the hands of the government. The cooperative 
sector includes cooperative production and distribution companies and institutions 
established in the cities and villages on the basis of Islamic principles. The private 
sector is related to agriculture, husbandry, industry, trade and services that supple-
ment the economic activities of public and cooperative sectors. The public sector 
more than doubled after the Islamic Revolution. People were employed in minis-
tries, municipalities, government organizations and bureaucracies, and most impor-
tant, the new Islamic revolutionary organizations. As the state assumed a greater 
role in the economy, it was vital to form a path to economic growth, in accordance 
with the principles of Islam. To do so, a consensus should have been accomplished 
within the ranks of the Islamic Republican Party. This political party was formed 
in 1979, as the biggest political force in the post-revolutionary period. It consisted 
of many political factions, views and thoughts. Because of that the party could not 
work as a coherent and institutionalized political party: it was dissolved in 1987. 
After that no new party emerged in Iran, and it practically became a non-party state. 
This does not mean, however, that there is no political arena. Instead of considering 
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Iran as a monolithic regime, the world should see Iran as a place of vicious political 
debates, with several big factions and completely different worldviews. The system 
works on formal and informal power structures (Rakel, 2008: 51; Thaler, Nader et 
al., 2010: 40). The formal structures consist of the state institutions (Office of the 
Supreme Leader or Rahbar, President, Government, Parliament, military and secu-
rity forces, and the national security offices)3 and the aligned institutions including 
the religious supervisory bodies (the Guardian Council, Expediency Council, As-
sembly of Experts), the republican institutions, and the religious foundations. The 
informal power structure resembles the political party life in the West. It consists of 
the different political factions of the political elite, notably the Conservatives, the 
Pragmatists, the Principalists and the Reformists. They cut across the state institu-
tions and present various ideas in the economy, society, culture and politics. Addi-
tionally, there are individuals who have power, influence or particular discourse that 
build their own personal networks. 
This basic introduction to the bases of power is necessary to understand the 
practical social welfare in contemporary Iran, as the religious foundations form 
the basis of the political-economic system of the country (Rakel, 2008). Called 
bonyads, they have a large impact on the economy of Iran. The origins of bony-
ads goes back to the period of the Shah, when they provided humanitarian aid to 
the poor and other populations in need, but also served as slush funds for the elite 
and helped deliver patronage (Thaler, Nader et al., 2010: 57). The most important 
bonyads are the Foundation for the Oppressed and Disabled (Bonyad-e Mostaza-
fan va Janbazan), the Martyrs’ Foundation (Bonyad-e Shahid) and the Imam Reza 
Foundation (Bonyad-e Astan-e Quds). Mostazafan is the largest foundation in Iran 
and well integrated into the Iranian economy. It allocates 50 per cent of its profits to 
“...providing aid to the needy in the form of low-interest loans or monthly pensions, 
while it invests the remaining 50 per cent in its various subsidiaries (as it) owns 
and operates approximately 350 subsidiary and affiliate companies in numerous 
industries including agriculture, industry, transportation, and tourism” (Wehrey et 
al., 2009: 57, 58). Bonyad-e Shahid, because of its close contact with the IRGC, 
gives home loans to thousands of Basijis4 and the families of martyrs. The heads 
of these foundations are appointed by the Rahbar. They have tasks to safeguard 
the Islamic and revolutionary principles of the Islamic Republic and often work as 
charities, especially for low-income groups, families of martyrs, former prisoners of 
war, rural dwellers, guardian-less households, and the disabled. Effectively, they act 
as a state in a state, as they work parallel to state institutions. Many bonyads look 
3 For more information on the political system of Iran, see: Obućina, 2010.
4 A paramilitary volunteer militia, an auxiliary force engaged in internal security, providing the 
social service, organising religious ceremonies etc.
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like state ministries, but with more religious and revolutionary zeal. For example, 
“...the Housing Foundation (Bonyad-e Maskan) operates along with the Housing 
Ministry providing housing to families in need. The Literacy Movement (Nehzat-e 
Savad-Amoozi) acts along with the Ministry of Education. The Supreme Council 
of Cultural Revolution (Shoura-ye Ali-Ye Enqelab-e Farhangi) competes with the 
Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance in setting the cultural policy” (Rakel, 
2008: 57). Additionally, they are responsible only to the Rahbar and have no public 
accounts and are tax exempt, which gives them a great advantage. Many of them 
look like private monopolies, and they account for 35 per cent of Iran’s total gross 
national product and over 40 per cent of the non-oil sector of the Iranian economy 
(Arjomand, 2009). They were especially successful during the Rafsanjani presiden-
cies, when they “...controlled and disbursed billions of dollars and greatly enriched 
those associated with them, using their own wealth to gain patronage, invest in a 
wide array of business interests, and generally advance their own power and influ-
ence” (Thaler, Nader et al., 2010: 57). Bonyads form the bulk of the social justice 
programs in Iran, albeit with a strong message of loyalty to the Islamic Republic. 
Their money is used for supporting the schools, universities and research centers, 
the publication of books and journals, the production of films, the organization of 
art and book festivals, and donations to museums. According to its own statistics, 
only during the 1979 and 1980 bonyad Crusade for Construction (Jehad-e Sazande-
gi) built 1.934 houses, 1.997 schools, 48 mosques, 1.464 public baths, and 80 hos-
pitals, all in the countryside, as well as digging more than 2000 wells, distributing 
over 4 million books and holding more than 3000 literary classes (Dorraj, 1992: 
155). They are able to give social welfare to various deprived segments of Iranian 
society, and in doing so bonyads gain strength vis-a-vis the different factions of the 
political elite. Each of the factions has to take into account the strength of the bony-
ads, as they can influence many domestic policies. They often do it together with 
the Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution (IRGC, usually known as the 
Revolutionary Guard, Pasdaran or Sepah), “...a key institution in Iran due to its role 
as guardian of the revolution, and because many senior Revolutionary Guard offic-
ers have close personal and family ties to key members of the Iranian political elite” 
(Rakel, 2008: 57; also Arjomand, 2009; Wehrey et al., 2009; Thaler, Nader et al., 
2010: 109). The IRGC controls 70 per cent of Iran’s state-run economy (Morady, 
2011: 51), and through the mobilization of the deprived rural and lower-class popu-
lation they offer technical job training, scholarships and other financial benefits. 
The IRGC’s reconstruction headquarters Ghorb or Khatam al-Anbia, Iran’s larg-
est contractor in industrial and development projects, is also very active in the oil 
industry and is said to be operating as “the sole contractor for Iran’s gas industry” 
(Wehrey et al., 2009: 61). Although the IRGC can be considered to be involved in 
a social populism in their own style, giving social welfare and asking for political 
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support of the masses, in time they became also synonymous for corruption and 
nepotism. In the clash of two social populisms, Ahmadinejad rose as part of the 
avant-garde to this system, blaming “economic mafias” and “a gentleman who still 
today has an important post at the centre of power”5 as the causes of the country’s 
economic problems (Thaler, Nader et al., 2010: 110). Ahmadinejad’s campaign was 
viciously directed against other candidates in the presidential races, amongst whom 
were politicians closely connected to various bonyads and especially former presi-
dent Rafsanjani, although Ahmadinejad himself comes from an IRGC background. 
After the Revolution, the government started a broad program of social welfare 
and social justice, consisting of subsidies in virtually every corner of the econo-
my. Housing and agriculture were very important at the time. A movement called 
“revolutionary housing” (maskan-e enqelabi) transformed the social geography of 
urban life in Iran: “Rigid zoning laws and urban gentrification during the 1970s had 
pushed the swelling urban poor to the margins of large cities. (...) After the collapse 
of the monarchy, (...) the way opened for spontaneous occupation of vast tracks 
of urban land, often in collusion with the new local revolutionary organizations” 
(Ehsani, 2009: 56), which doubled and tripled big cities in Iran. Ehsani argues the 
city living may become predominant, but existing cities lost their shape and urban 
life became increasingly chaotic and difficult to manage. This intense populist de-
mand even ended up in the Constitution; Article 31 stresses the access to decent 
housing as a citizen’s right and the state’s obligation. The government could confis-
cate vacant and undeveloped land, and it could use it for housing facilities. Housing 
residences doubled between 1976 and 1986 (ibid.: 57). This housing policy con-
tinued after the Iran-Iraq war, amidst all the expenses, international isolation and 
frozen capital abroad. In the second Ahmadinejad administration, the government 
introduced the Mehr housing scheme, with several thousand units of housing fa-
cilities, as an affordable populist measure. But, it seems the Mehr initiative was so 
poorly mismanaged that these buildings now lack water, gas and sewage (al-moni-
tor.com, 9.8.2014). The Iranian economy has suffered throughout the Iran-Iraq war 
and later from rationing, inefficiency, and corruption. In 1982 the government creat-
ed the Urban Land Organization (ULO), which helped to distribute land to the peo-
ple, but also to individuals, state employees and cooperatives, and converted public 
land into private property (ibid.: 61). The benefit was more to the recipients with 
strong institutional ties to the ruling regime. Ehsani makes a critique that refugees 
and residents who could not master political connections, and had few resources of 
their own, had to rent housing or find other forms of shelter. 
Agriculture was another major policy of the new government. The declining 
living standards in the rural areas and increasing poverty during the Shah era resulted 
5 Meaning Rafsanjani.
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in massive migrations of the rural poor to the cities. In order not to provoke the fur-
ther deterioration of rural areas, the Islamic Republic introduced a combination of 
“...subsidization/controlled pricing and two-tier pricing, with coupon allocation for 
certain categories of the population” (Shakoori, 2001: 119). But, the reasoning was 
somewhat difficult to follow. Wheat was considered a major staple food and the 
government purchased whatever the farmers produced, while controlling the pri-
ces of wheat and making it as low as possible: “The government subsidizes bread 
in the towns at a price far below that fixed for wheat, which induces the peasants, 
especially those in villages close to towns, to become customers of the municipal 
bakeries, which in turn drives up the demand for wheat and allows farmers to sell 
more wheat to the state” (ibid.: 120). Another staple food in Iran is rice, but it has 
very little subsidization, and is mostly based on open market fluctuations. Overall, 
essential items’ prices were reduced as much as 75 per cent.
Threats to the Socioeconomic System in Iran
The Sustainability of Economy
A rise in the birthrate, an economic boom after the Iran-Iraq war, and under the Raf-
sanjani presidency the gradual opening of Iran to the world market, made the Islamic 
Republic system possible. But, after some time, Iran started to apply more capital-
ist measures to bolster the economy, but also to lower the pressure of the subsidies 
and social welfare. The consequences of the sanctions were higher unemployment 
and soaring inflation which was tamed at 20 per cent annually. The consequence of 
war, the collapse of oil revenues and governmental mismanagement of the economy, 
especially after the initial success of Rafsanjani’s reform and reconstruction, which 
collapsed in just two years in the beginning of the 1990s, are problems which the 
Islamic Republic may face in the long run. However, after an initial recovery during 
the Khatami years, the real improvement in people’s welfare came in the early 2000s. 
In times of Ahmadinejad’s rise to power, the newly elected president was chosen on 
a platform of a “return to the Revolution”. It was not primarily a political affair, but 
a social and economic one: “The election was fought on the recurring political theme 
of redistribution and helping the poor. Ahmadinejad’s appeal was his promise to 
fight high-level corruption and to bring oil money to people’s dinner table” (Davis, 
Robinson, 2006: 186, 187; Salehi-Esfahani, 2009: 3), although the poverty was quite 
low by international standards. Reducing poverty succeeded, but inequality is still a 
big issue in the country, especially amongst the younger generations. It raised ques-
tions over the use of the oil reserves. Namely, Iran is second only to Saudi Arabia in 
oil and gas reserves. According to OPEC, Iran has 157,30 billion barrels of proven 
crude oil reserves and 33,780 billion cu.m. of proven natural gas reserves (http://
www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/163.htm, 30.7.2014).
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Ahmadinejad’s idea was severely populist, and although it might have been 
his genuine idea, it was an economic myth, as Salehi-Esfahani argues: “an equita-
ble distribution of oil revenues – or for that matter, all government spending – is a 
desirable end in itself, but oil revenues by themselves are not large enough to eradi-
cate poverty or improve income equality by much. (...) No doubt effective use of oil 
income to promote economic growth can reduce unemployment substantially, but 
foreign-exchange inflows from oil are generally not good for job growth, as they 
cause real appreciation, which places the tradable sectors (agriculture and manufac-
turing in particular) at a disadvantage” (2006: 4, 5). So, in effect, the policy of tak-
ing oil money to people’s dinner table could cause serious calamities in the national 
economy, but it is a good populist catch-phrase. As the average citizen cannot be 
sure how the distribution of oil wealth is carried out, accusations of corruption are 
ever present, and the electorate is especially prone to distributive justice. The Ah-
madinejad government still did not listen to economic experts, as “about one-third 
of the oil production is allotted for domestic use, which is sold at such low prices 
that it functions very much as direct payments to citizens, except that it goes most-
ly to those who own cars, homes, and electrical gadgets. Imported goods that help 
keep the prices of essential items low – food and medicine – are also similar in ef-
fect to direct payments, but these are more progressively distributed” (ibid.: 5, 6), 
while the rest is divided into investments and consumption, especially for the vast 
civil service and losses of public enterprises. As the process is not transparent, there 
are all sorts of ways to foster corruption and the suspicion of corruption. Neverthe-
less, the sectors related to the oil revenues started to grow, especially manufacturing 
and construction, while agriculture continued to be affected by the weather. But, as 
Salehi-Esfahani rightly points out, the economy that bases its sustained growth only 
on oil resources cannot have long run stability, as the fluctuations in the oil mar-
ket are constant. The slower economic growth in the last few years, caused by the 
global financial crisis, has resulted in slower global energy consumption. In 2012 
China and India alone accounted for nearly 90 per cent of the net increase in global 
energy consumption, while OECD countries declined for the fourth time in a row, 
led by a large decline in the US. The consumer states are trying to reduce depend-
ency on any single region, and the world is increasingly becoming regionalized in 
(1) United States, Canada and Mexico, (2) Western Europe and Russia, (3) East 
Asia, and (4) Persian Gulf, which make interdependence and not dependence the 
cornerstone of today’s global energy markets (Bahgat, 2003: 26). Additionally, the 
growing population in Iran, and growing domestic consumption will likely cause 
the oil exports to decline in the future. Salehi-Esfahani argues that “(t)he ascent of 
populist politics has – at best – delayed the plan to increase energy prices in Iran to 
bring them closer to cost. (...) Iran’s oil wealth is no longer sufficient for economic 
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growth because its oil revenues are too small relative to the investment needs of a 
fast-growing labour force, especially the young” (Salehi-Esfahani, 2006: 9, 10). Al-
though the Oil Stabilization Fund was created in 2000, the pressure on it from popu-
list politics did not give the Fund a chance to work properly, as the Parliament gave 
the government permission to withdraw money for current and future expenditures. 
The result is lack of direct and foreign investment, a rise in inflation, but also the 
existence of a good electoral base. 
The years of mismanagement, however, have recently posed an unprecedented 
challenge to the populist politics. Subsidies are undergoing a major reform from 
2010. The Iranian targeted subsidy plan was passed by the Majles in January 2010 
and involves major changes in government policy. The subsidies on food and energy 
will be replaced with targeted social assistance, and move to free market prices in a 
5 year period, which was later postponed by the new Rouhani government. Most of 
subsidies is food; more than 60 per cent of the government’s subsidy program goes 
to basic needs for food and medicine. Some 15 per cent of the GDP covers energy 
subsidies. International pressure is also a large factor. Iran cannot become a full 
member of the World Trade Organization (WTO), necessary for the expansion of 
its non-oil exports, as the subsidies encourage waste and pollution, and because of 
the lack of transparency in the subsidies program. The General Council of the WTO 
established a Working Party to examine the application of Iran in May 2005, and 
the Iranian government submitted its Memorandum on the Foreign Trade Regime 
in November 2009, but the Working Party has not yet met. Some progress, mainly 
on agriculture, was noticed in December 2011. Iran spends 90 to 100 billion USD 
on annual subsidies, but Ahmadinejad’s government tried to phase out subsidies for 
fuel, water, flour, bread, wheat, rice, oil, milk, sugar and postal and transportation 
services, seen as one of the most important undertakings in Iran’s economic history. 
Instead of subsidies, both Ahmadinejad and Rouhani governments aim to increase 
targeted social assistance. In the report from 2011, one year after the new subsidy 
reform plan started, the World Bank group reported reduced poverty and income 
disparities in Iran (Tehran Times, http://www.tehrantimes.com/index.php/economy-
and-business/2830-subsidy-plan-reduces-poverty-and-income-disparities-in-iran-
world-bank, 17.8.2014). In its 20-year vision document and the 5th Five-Year De-
velopment Plan, Iran, as the second biggest Middle Eastern economy and country 
with social indicators relatively high by regional standards, will foster a transforma-
tion of its current system towards a market-based economy. 
Although the move towards the market economy is obviously necessary, the 
move might jeopardize the support for the government, increasingly seen as the 
social protector. This move, moreover, has been tried two times before, in the Con-
stitutional Revolution and the White Revolution. History tells us the changes in 
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society in Iran have always been carried out in a close alliance of the bazaaris and 
clergy (Rahman, 1984: 104; Shakoori, 2001: 48). This traditional alliance was based 
on a simple connection: the bazaaris were the main source of religious taxes, which 
enabled the religious establishment to be financially independent of the state. As 
the bazaaris lacked the power to oppose the state, they were interested in being mo-
rally, intellectually and politically connected with the clergy. They have formed a 
traditional middle class (tabaqeh-e motavasateh-e sunnati), a coalition that can be 
traced back to the 19th century, and opposed to the Western educated new middle 
class rowshanfekran (Abrahamian, 2008: 35). Some authors in fact claim that Islam 
in general and the Islamic Republic in particular have survived because of their abi-
lity to adapt to differing class interests, especially because of the financial support of 
tradesmen, the bazaaris, landowners, industrialist and the bureaucrats, who consoli-
dated their role through building seminaries and recruiting students (Morady, 2011: 
42). Although Iran has never been a colony, it was still dominated by the European 
powers, and thus the policies of Iranian rulers “...were not independent” (Rahman, 
1984: 44). The increasing presence of diplomats and military personnel from Great 
Britain, France and Russia, coupled with corruptive Qajar dynasty resulted in what 
history calls “the Great Game” or “the Tournament of Shadows” (Morgan, 1973; 
Hopkirk, 1992; Abrahamian, 2008; Walberg, 2012). In the strategic battle between 
London and Moscow, Qajar rulers like Naser al-Din Shah (1848-1896) and his suc-
cessor Mozaffar al-Din Shah (1896-1907) compromised the position of the Shah 
and provoked the reaction of the clergy and people (see: Amanat, 2008). The arrival 
of the new ideas, but also direct threat of Big Powers to the vital tobacco industry 
in the country, resulted in the Constitutional Revolution of 1905. Regarding the ele-
ments involved, this revolution shared a remarkable resemblance to the Islamic 
Revolution of 1979; it consisted of the merchants, clerics, Muslim reformist intel-
lectuals, secular liberals and nationalists, with an overall aim to “...limit the despot-
ism of the Shah through a constitution, an elected legislature and an independent ju-
diciary” (Mir-Hosseini, Tapper, 2006: 12). The revolution was triggered in 1904-05 
by an economic crisis brought about by government bankruptcy and spiraling in-
flation. When Muzaffar al-Din Shah tried to raise land taxes amid acute inflation, 
the revolution prompted the last Qajar Shah Muhammad Ali to sign the fundamen-
tal Laws and open a short-lived parliament. After the First World War an army 
general and a fierce secular nationalist Reza Khan toppled the Qajar dynasty and 
soon thereafter proclaimed the Pahlavi dynasty, organized as westernizing secular, 
nationalist, centralized and militarized rule. His rule was full of reforms that were 
welcomed by the people, but he deprived the clergy of former resources and estab-
lished a dictatorship, closely attached to rising Nazi Germany. In the early stages 
of the Second World War, British and Soviet forces occupied Iran and forced Reza 
Shah to abdicate in favor of his son Mohammad Reza. His style of governing was 
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the same as his father’s, and after the Mosaddeq affair, he became a US-supported 
autocrat. His basic reform was labelled the “White Revolution”, or the “Revolution 
of the Shah and People”, in 1962, which included economic and land reforms, as 
well as a secularizing program. It “...eliminated the remaining independent local 
power held by the major tribal and provincial landowning class and turn(ed) them 
into clients of the central state” (Ehsani, 2009: 43). Local associations, political or-
ganizations and social groups that existed throughout the counties lost any ability 
to survive. The wealthy class of urban and highly educated Iranians lost any contact 
with Iran outside Northern Tehran, a residential area, and indeed with the feeling 
of the country itself. The White Revolution was in many ways a complete failure: 
“Most peasants received no or little land. Most villages were left without electric-
ity, schools, piped water, rural roads, and other basic amenities. What is more, go-
vernment imposed prices on agricultural goods favored the urban sector at the ex-
pense of the countryside” (Abrahamian, 2008: 142). Again, the same elements of 
society, headed by merchants, clergy, nationalists, Muslim intellectuals, nationalists 
and leftists, formed a broad anti-Shah coalition, ending in the Iranian Revolution. 
Among different ideas of the new state, popular democracy, socialist state, strong 
nation-state and Islamic government occurred, but the overwhelming influence and 
charisma of Ayatollah Khomeini gave way to the Islamic Republic. It was heavily 
backed by the bazaaris. The first Islamic Majles consisted of mostly young teachers, 
students and seminarians, coming from rural backgrounds and provincial towns, as 
a direct opposition to the Shah’s urban elite. The bazaaris were the driving force in 
every revolutionary movement in the 20th century, but after the Islamic Revolution 
something totally unexpected happened: the political disenfranchisement and eco-
nomic marginalization of the bazaar. The Revolution weakened the bazaar, making 
it dependent on state regulated networks; self-governance, which was the symbol 
of the bazaar, vanished. On the other hand, rise of the bonyads left little space for 
the bazaar to play a key trading role in the society. Ahmadinejad’s contester in 2009 
elections MirHossein Mousavi had a pretty similar populist message in the early 
days of the Islamic Republic when he acted as prime minister. He increased state 
control of Iran’s economy and imposed government rationing to feed the poor, what 
he called the Islamic social justice and preservation of the revolution. But, the ba-
zaaris felt it otherwise. It was obvious already in 1984, as the bazaaris paid only 2 
per cent of all tax receipts, in contrast to the 76 per cent coming from government 
employees (Morady, 2011: 47). 
The Requests of the Ethnic Minorities
In many ways, Iran resembles the civic nation-state, as seen in France or Greece. 
Effectively, all citizens of Iran are Iranians. However, there are 100 different eth-
nic groups living in Iran, with two basic backgrounds: Indo-European and Turkic. 
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The main ethnic groups in Iran are: Persians (51%), Azeris (24%), Gilaki and 
Mazandarani (8%), Kurds (7%), Arabs (3%), Baluchi (2%), Lurs (2%), Turkmens 
(2%), Qashqai, Armenians, Jews, Georgians, Assyrians, Cherkez, Tats, Pashtun and 
others (1%). The official state religion is the Twelver Shi’a branch of Islam, to 
which adheres 90 to 95 per cent of the population. Between 4 and 8 per cent belong 
to the Sunni branch of Islam, mainly Kurds and Baluchi, while another 2 per cent of 
the population are various non-Muslim religious minorities, like Christians, Jews, 
Zoroastrians, Yazidis, Baha’i and others. Armenians, Assyrians, Jews and Zoroas-
trians are recognized as ahl al-dhimma (protected people) or ahl al-kitab (people 
of the Book) and possess some special rights, like the ability to vote for their own 
deputies, the right to assemble, the right to practice their religion freely, but can-
not stand for many electoral posts, as these are reserved for Muslim Shi’a (Tohi-
di, 2009: 302). The Iranian government has been systematically accused for being 
“racist” and running a vicious campaign of nationalistic politics. In his rather sub-
jective study on Persian (Farsi) nationalism, Iranian Azeri scholar Alireza Asghar-
zadeh claims that for the last 80 years the Iranian government, Pahlavi dynasty and 
Islamic Republic alike, have continuously forbidden every possibility for the social, 
political, cultural and economic development of non-Persian communities in Iran, 
and especially non-Farsi speaking communities, such as Arabs, Azeris and Kurds. 
As an outcome, the Islamic Republic has not put much effort into developing the 
provinces where these populations are dominant, which is also evident in the lack 
of education, lower literacy, poor economic conditions and constant centralisation 
and control of the area (Asgharzadeh, 2007). The author is missing a few relevant 
facts. He points to the Iranian (Persian) elite, while not acknowledging that the 
“...Islamic Republic should be characterized as much by its provincial character as 
by its Islamist ideology” (Ehsani, 2009: 39). Ehsani rightly points that the revolu-
tion against the Shah was backed by provincial communities exactly because of the 
authoritarian and highly centralized actions of the court: “One of Reza Shah’s initial 
strategies in consolidation was the systematic subjugation and eventual elimination 
of all autonomous local power centers; the intent was to concentrate administra-
tive, coercive, and political decision-making in Tehran” (ibid.: 43). After all, the 
founder of the Islamic Republic Ayatollah Khomeini himself was disgusted by na-
tionalism (Taheri, 2010). However, the rising pan-Turkism and pan-Arabism helps 
the indigenous communities of different ethnic background to raise claims against 
the Islamic Republic, based on human rights and rights of expression. The practical 
discrimination notwithstanding, they lack a point concerning the Constitution of the 
Islamic Republic, which recognizes the rights of ethnic and linguistic minorities: 
“The official Language and script of Iran, the lingua franca of its people, is Persian. 
Official documents, correspondence, and texts, as well as textbooks, must be in this 
language and script. However, the use of regional and tribal languages in the press 
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and mass media, as well as for teaching of their literature in schools, is allowed 
in addition to Persian” (article 15). Also, article 19 claims that “all people of Iran, 
whatever the ethnic group or tribe to which they belong, enjoy equal rights; color, 
race, language, and the like, do not bestow any privilege”. And indeed, although the 
pan-Turkic and pan-Arab propaganda wants to show it differently, Iran has media 
publications in minority languages and Arabic is thought as compulsory language in 
schools. It goes to the point that many cultural and political officials, including the 
Rahbar himself, are non-Persian and yet consider themselves Iranian and use Farsi. 
These policies continue the support of the ethno-linguistic minorities for economic 
and cultural reforms, which is evident already in the aggregate nature of the elec-
toral results in these peripheral provinces (Gheissari, Sanandaji, 2009: 290). 
Today, with the idea of permanent state borders evidently already shattered in 
Europe, ideas of pan-Arabism and pan-Turkism can pose a direct threat to the Is-
lamic Republic. Pan-Turkism is an irredentist Turkish idea with the “...guiding ob-
jective (...) to strive for some sort of union – cultural or physical, or both – among 
all peoples of proven or alleged Turkic origins, whether living within or outside 
the frontiers of the Ottoman Empire” (Landau, 1995: 1). Azeris, next to Volga Ta-
tars, Crimea Tatars, Kazakhs, Turkmens, Uzbeks and Kirghiz, are among the most 
prominent Turkic groups prone to the idea of pan-Turkism. Since the inauguration 
of the idea in the Young Turks Revolution, the pan-Turkists have involved Tabriz as 
one of the main focal points of the movement. The irredentist tendencies continued 
after the First World War and the establishment of the Republic of Turkey. In 1930 
Reşit Saffet, a pan-Turkic writer, claimed “...the Iranian authorities were annihilat-
ing (the Turks in Iran). Saffet declared that he did not demand any of Iran’s territory, 
but that something must be done immediately to rescue the Turks there” (ibid.: 85). 
In 1940, that number, according to Ahmet Caferoğlu, was five million in Iran, when 
the population of the whole country was ten million (ibid.: 86). It is considered 
today that some 8-10 million Azeris live in Iran (ibid.: 197), helping form a con-
tinuously populated area from Azerbaijan proper, today an independent republic, 
to northwestern Iran. Interestingly enough, Baku voices no considerable irredentist 
movement toward the shaping of a united Azerbaijan, but Turkish nationalists do. 
The area of Central Asian republics, in their rediscovering of national and Islamic 
identity, became a subject of several different geopolitical influences. Russia still 
plays a dominant role in the economy, but politically and culturally, these states are 
divided between their proximity to Iran and their proximity to Turkey. Iran borders 
Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, while Turkey shares only a small border 
with Azerbaijan. Yet, only Tajikistan has a special relation with Iran, as it shares a 
similar cultural tradition and the Persian language, while others are more culturally 
close to Turkey. And while Azerbaijan wants ever more political ties with Ankara, 
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Azeris are still religiously closer to Tehran, as they are, like the majority of Irani-
ans, Shi’a Muslims.
Another minority which has an impact of the stability of the Islamic Republic 
are Arabs, especially in the oil-rich province of Khuzestan and in the Persian Gulf. 
In the long-term Iran will have to take a bigger role in the Persian Gulf: “Iran is a 
country with significant resources and potentials, including a large population (...), 
with a unique geographic position in the strategic Strait of Hormuz. If past experi-
ence is of any indication, Iran will continue to preserve its national security interests 
in the area. Thus, it is likely that Iran will re-emerge as a pivotal country in shap-
ing the contours of regional politics in the twenty-first century” (Amirahmadi, En-
tessar, 1999: 3). This Iranian role is deeply distrusted and possibly feared by Iran’s 
Arab neighbors, which is visible also in the name dispute over the Persian Gulf it-
self (whether it is Persian or Arab, or something else). Iranian Ambassador to UN 
Kamal Kharrazi demonstrated the importance of security for Iran and the Persian 
Gulf countries: “From a strategic point of view, peace and security in the Persian 
Gulf are indivisible, a perspective which became clear in the course of the Iran-Iraq 
war... Iran continues to promote the concept of indivisibility of peace and security 
among its neighbors... All the littoral states of the Persian Gulf... depend on safety 
and security... to maintain their single-product (oil) export and their large volume 
of imports. Thus, cooperation amongst regional states can only enhance peace and 
security in the region. The establishment of a mechanism by the states in the Persian 
Gulf region for dealing with security issues, threat perception, and other concerns 
will be a positive first step in this important endeavour” (Marshall, 2003: 151). This 
regional cooperation, however, does not include the foreign presence, whether the 
West (Europe, USA), or the East (India, China). The fear of the Islamic Republic, 
the Shi’a Persian nationalism and the Iranian domination of the Persian Gulf still 
govern most of the political, security and even trade relations between the Persian 
Gulf countries. American support to oil kingdoms favors this climate and makes 
every move forward impossible. This fear is evident already in the efforts to rename 
the Persian Gulf the Arabian Gulf and to point to the oppressed Arab citizens in Iran. 
Many presidential candidates stressed the importance of answering the ethnic 
and religious minorities’ requests. They have travelled extensively in these areas 
to claim their support, both from the reformists and conservative camps. It is in-
teresting that only Ahmadinejad did not talk about ethnic issues or make special 
promises to ethnic minorities, but he “...emphasized the need to decentralize the 
state bureaucracy and empower the provincial governors, this was seen in line with 
his election platform of ‘social justice’ and change in distributive policies, as Ah-
madinejad promised he would put national wealth at the service of the masses and 
not the economic elite concentrated in the central part of Iran” (Tohidi, 2009: 318). 
It is interesting thus, that Ahmadinejad in fact softened a large amount of attitudes 
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and standpoints of ethnic minorities, focusing on his populist appeal of return to 
the revolutionary ideas of equality, justice and anticorruption, highlighting his own 
humble background, austere lifestyle, visible already in his clothes, named khak-
sari (down-to-earth), like his notorious five-dollar shirts, his rejection of Western 
clothes and his condemnation of wearing neckties, as a sign of submission to the 
Crusaders (David, Robinson, 2006). This notion is quite ridiculous in Iran, as Irani-
an historians point to the fact that Iran invented the necktie and that merchants from 
Yazd brought it to Europe, and spread it primarily among Croatian soldiers (Avar-
zamani, 2013: 48, 49). On the other hand, the issue of ethnic minorities is often used 
to accuse the Western world, particularly the United States and Great Britain “...of 
plotting to ‘dismember’ Iran by aiding ethnic insurgent and separatist groups, such 
as the Baluchis in the southeast, the Arabs in the southwest, and the Kurds in the 
northwest” (Thaler, Nader et al., 2010: 11). 
Social Policies for Women and Youth
While the ethnic disturbances might destabilize the Iranian state, the more serious 
challenge to the Islamic Republic is rising youth and their demands. Since the Re-
volution, Iran has experienced massive social changes: Iran’s population has “more 
than doubled to 70 million, of whom 80 per cent are below 40 years of age, 70 per 
cent under 35, and 50 per cent under 25. The literacy rate has also rocketed, from 48 
per cent at the time of the revolution to 90 per cent now, with 60 per cent of young 
Iranians attending college or university” (Morady, 2011: 42). It goes especially for 
women. The massive expansion of female schooling and professional education af-
ter the Islamic Revolution is often shown as one of the great achievements of the 
revolution for Iranian women. Education is also at the core of the Islamic belief, and 
devoted Muslims should always seek more education and knowledge. After the re-
volution, the number of the ISI-recognized scientific publications soared: from 398 
in 1979 up to 5.423 in 2005, and rising (Khosrokhavar, 2009: 212). More than half 
of the university educated citizens of Iran are women and they can play a vital role 
in the support of the regime. Before the Revolution, most women were employed 
for low-pay or unpaid family work, but especially after 2000, employed women ori-
ented to the professional service occupations, “...increasingly working in the private 
sector and taking on managerial and entrepreneurial roles, (going away from the) 
carpet and cottage industry workforce, which was the main source of an increase in 
female employment in the 1960s and 1970s” (Bahramitash, Salehi-Esfahani, 2009: 
78). According to the census in 2006, “...33% of Iran’s female labour force was in 
professional jobs, concentrated in education, healthcare and social services, with 
slightly over half of all teachers in Iran being women; however, the female share of 
the labour force was less than 20%, considerably below the world average of 45%” 
(Mehdizadeh, 2012: 245). In this way, women have been gradually shifting away 
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from agricultural and manufacturing sectors, and settling in the service sector, pre-
dominantly education, health and social services. Bahramitash and Salehi-Esfahani 
also show a decline in overall female employment after the revolution, but do not 
connect it to the “Islamization” process. The downfall of employment occurred 
mostly in handicraft manufacturing, where westernizing patterns did not even oc-
cur. The effect of the Islamic Revolution in the sense of depriving women of their 
jobs affected only a relatively small number of middle-class and elite women in the 
urban areas (Bahramitash, Salehi-Esfahani, 2009: 119). The “Islamization” role of 
women as “wife and mother, the agent of peace and stability in the family” (Mehdi-
zadeh, 2012: 246) has been surpassed by the socio-economic activities, which also 
made a significant progress in the early childhood education. Rising education, a 
lower birth rate, marrying at a later age and increasing job demands will make a par-
ticular impact in the future. As the private sector is still too weak, the coming years 
will see much effort of women in Iran to make their demands heard in the govern-
ment. Their political voice may not be direct, but “president Khatami’s landslide 
election of 1997 is generally deemed a result of the active participation of women 
and youth” (Haeri, 2009: 126). The contested issues regarding Iranian women are 
not, as widely believed in the West, veiling or practicing an Islamic lifestyle, they 
are structural and legal, in terms of basic rights, which are often contested, although 
the state itself pushes the rhetoric of respect for women and propagates the model 
of ideal womanhood. Educationally superior and increasingly self-aware, women of 
all backgrounds and beliefs (including the conservative women) will increasingly 
contest their male counterparts in legal, social, political and economic spheres. 
The young generation is challenging the revolutionary leaders who are now in 
their 60s and 70s, and getting increasingly vulnerable to the physical demands of 
their jobs. The middle and younger generation of politicians, those who were stu-
dents at the time of the revolution, like Ahmadinejad, are likely to become key per-
sonalities in Iran. Economic equality in Iran before the industrialization in the 1960s 
was very high, and it in fact increased with the rapid capitalist industrialization, but 
after the Islamic Revolution economic equality has been reduced, although only to 
the 1960 level (Arjomand, 2009: 121). It is one of the major impacts of bonyads. 
Conclusion
Throughout the 20th century Iranians cared for social justice and welfare. From the 
liberating movement against the Qajars to the Islamic Revolutions, Iranians were 
triggered by an unjust economic system to raise a revolution. Now, this desire for 
better living may end in a major political, social and economic change in the short- 
to middle-range future in Iran. It will not be revolutionary change, nor is it likely it 
will mean the downfall of the Islamic Republic. Indeed, in many ways the Islamic 
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Republic raised the living standards and wellbeing of Iranians. It was more a social 
revolution than a political one. It successfully encouraged an increase in education 
and social welfare. The economy, whatever the sanctions, has gradually become 
better. The demands, however, are rising. These demands are seen in voting pat-
terns, the rise of youth and women, the use of social networks. While the social 
conditions are better, the question of more democracy has come to the fore. Student 
organizations, NGOs, the protection of civil, political and social rights – this is the 
current discourse in Iran today. It is not necessarily a question raised by the reform-
ists. The bulk of the Iranian political elite is formed by conservative forces, but of 
different factions, competing among themselves even more than with reformists. 
The change of the economic system proved to be a prelude to the change of 
the political one. The bazaaris, now excluded from the main economic trends, had 
the overwhelming influence in this change. But, the government’s decision to turn 
more towards a market economy in Iran may well change this. Bazaaris were al-
ways numerous and heterogeneous, but still capable to unite in solidarity against 
external threats, but today their networks are less integrated and, due to the power 
of bonyads, lack a strong connection to the informal political structures and a say 
in the state policies, often regarded as unstable and causing market distortions. Al-
though they have not been impoverished, the bazaaris have been put aside to make 
place for a new middle class, consisting of state-affiliated traders. The bazaaris’ 
shared interest can be met only if they again enter political action, and this time 
they may well choose a non-conservative faction to align with. It is ironic that Ah-
madinejad gave them this opportunity, in an unprecedented move towards the mar-
ket economy. Nevertheless, the bazaaris’ move toward a better future and the return 
of the private economy will have to wait for a major transformation of the bonyads, 
as the informal power structure will have to willingly approve of the government 
privatization scheme, in which, no doubt, the IRGC and conservative forces will 
have a major influence.
The issues concerning the ethnic and religious minorities are vast. In compari-
son to neighboring countries, Iran is still an oasis of stability in the Middle East. 
There are many problems in the government’s approach to the country’s minorities, 
especially to those who are under a pan-Turkic and pan-Arabic sway. Given the 
ever turbulent neighborhood, Iran will have to give at least populist concessions in 
order not to distort the fragile ethnic balance, especially on its western and south-
eastern borders.
Overall, social justice and welfare have been at the core of the Islamic Revo-
lution, and the populist chant of “return to the Revolution” means exactly changes 
in economic and social policies. It is highly unlikely it will mean the change of the 
regime; more likely it will cement the people’s approval of the Islamic Republic.
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